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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University Institute was created to 
further three main goals. First, to continue the development of the European 
University Institute as a forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to scholars of European 
affairs. Third, to sponsor individual research projects on topics of current interest 
to the European Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
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article concludes by briefly examining some of the lessons Council, Commission and 
Parliament might draw from the experience.
2. The Historical and Political Context
The extraordinary chain of events, briefly summarised here, that began about 9 
November 1989, is well known. For the purposes of this article, what is important 
to note is that the timetable for unification, which was first mooted as a possibility 
and only later as a probability, became increasingly telescoped. Each change of date 
effectively presented the Community with a fait accompli, ultimately imposed by the 
democratic wishes of the GDR’s Volkskammer.
By the early autumn of 1989, following the opening of the Hungarian border, an 
estimated thirty thousand GDR citizens had emigrated to the West. A number of 
popular demonstrations took place, most notably in Leipzig, with increasingly open 
and insistent calls for democratic reforms. With this expectant atmosphere at its 
height, the European Council met in Strasbourg on 8 and 9 December 1989. The 
EC Heads of State and Government gave out a clear political signal by reaffirming 
their commitment to German unification. Within two months, with the unexpected, 
historical, official announcement on 9 November that ‘all border crossings... can be 
used and are now open’, German unification, for so long an unlikely possibility, 
became a distinct probability. Nevertheless, though distinct, the probability seemed 
distant.
The FRG Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, made little secret of his ambition to 
become the first chancellor of a unified Germany. He swiftly outlined a ten-point 
plan for a stage-by-stage reunification of the two Germanies. A key element in this 
plan, as in all speculative outlines of progress towards eventual unification, was the 
institution of all-German elections, both as a symbolic and as a normative step 
preceding unification itself. The holding of elections before 1991 seemed unlikely 
because of the external geo-political constraints involved. The basic attitude of the 
USSR seemed ambiguous, and it was in any case not clear that the two Germanies 





























































































The passage of emergency interim measures related to German unification 
through both their first and second readings during the European Parliament’s 10 
to 14 September 1990 plenary session provided an extraordinary, if not unique, 
example of inter-institutional and inter- governmental cooperation. This cooperative 
spirit, together with a generous institutional readiness to overlook the letter of 
hard-won or previously hard-defended conventions, demonstrated how the 
Community institutions were collectively able to rise to a historic occasion, and gave 
the lie to the oft-stated perception of the Community as a hide-bound, monolithic 
bureaucracy.
The basic problem involved was simple. The pace of German unification was 
faster than the Community’s capacity to legislate. It had therefore to adopt 
provisional, or emergency interim, measures to act as a stop-gap until due legislative 
process had provided the Community and the German authorities with a more 
permanent means of absorbing the former territories of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) into the Community.
The purpose of this article, therefore, is not to consider the substance of the 
vast negotiating process, equivalent to an accession, set in motion by the GDR’s 
decision to effectively dissolve itself and to accede to and unite with the Federal 
German Republic (FRG); others working far closer to the coalface will surely set 
down their experiences once the process is over. Rather, this article will be more 
narrowly concerned with the extraordinary procedural event which saw two 
Parliamentary and two Council readings, together with a Commission 
reconsideration, taking place within the space of just seven days where, especially 
on such substantive issues, they would normally have taken months, thus creating 
for the former territories of the GDR, together with the FRG, the legal framework 
and tools necessary for a gentle and protected entry into the Community.
This was a quiet but great victory for the Community institutions, both 




























































































known as the ‘four plus two’) could quickly settle the external complications of 
German unity.
Events thereafter moved with unexpected and steadily-increasing rapidity. The 
first democratic elections in the GDR were held on 18 March 1990, and resulted 
in electoral success for those parties favouring German unification on the most 
rapid possible basis (see Fitzmaurice, 1991, and Muller-Rommel, 1991). This was 
a watershed. The Dublin I European Council responded by endorsing the principle 
of German unification under a ‘European roof. More significantly, the Heads of 
State and Government decided that EEC Article 237 was inappropriate; in other 
words, that the GDR’s absorption into the FRG would not be treated as a classic 
accession to the Community (see 3.i below) (1). Negotiations between the new 
GDR coalition government and the government of the FRG proceeded apace, 
resulting in the signing of a State Treaty, the Staatsvertrag, which provided a 
framework for the introduction of economic, monetary and social union. The 
Staatsvertrag was concluded on 18 May 1990 and, after ratification by the FRG 
Bundestag and Bundesrat and the GDR Volkskammer, entered into force on 1 July 
1990.
Although, at the beginning of July, dates as far away as 1991 were still being 
mooted (the all-German elections had been provisionally scheduled for 2 
December), by the end of the month it had become clear that the date for 
unification was going to be brought much further forward. Two vital agreements 
had made this possible. First, on 16 July, at Stavropol in the USSR, Kohl and 
President Gorbachov came to a formal agreement on the four sticking points 
between their two countries: the new Germany’s membership of and status within 
NATO; the size of the new Germany’s army; the timetable for the departure of 
Russian forces from the former territories of the GDR; lastly, financial and other 
compensations for the USSR. The next day, in Paris, in the ‘four plus two’ context, 
Kohl was able to give categoric assurances on respect for the integrity of the 
German-Polish (Oder-Neisse) border. The consequent agreement meant that, 
although the USSR might hold out to extract maximum financial advantage, a green 




























































































meeting was scheduled for 12 September in Moscow, and it was widely expected 
that no strategic, geo-political barriers to unification would remain after it.
Meanwhile, a confused debate was taking place within both Germanies about 
electoral mechanics. At stake were the fortunes of a series of smaller GDR political 
parties, as coalition partners in the East and West jockeyed for maximum 
advantage. For example, the FRG SDP (the SDP was in opposition in Bonn, but 
part of the governing coalition in the GDR) wanted all-German elections with a 
five per cent threshold, calculating that this would blot out the small GDR German 
Social Union Party (it had won 6.3 per cent of the votes cast in March), an ally of 
the Bavarian Christian Social Union. The GDR Prime Minister, Lothar de Maziere, 
argued against the GDR joining the FRG before the pan-German elections because 
it would obliterate the hopes of all the smaller GDR political parties. Ultimate 
agreement on an electoral formula was not reached until 1 August.
Following Malcom Muggeridge’s dictum that ‘a row is never about what it’s 
about’, the arguments about electoral systems hid a more fundamental argument 
about the date of the elections themselves. The row was precipitated by the virtual 
collapse of the East German economy. Unemployment doubled in July to 270,000, 
and three times that number were on short time. Rather than stepping altruistically 
into the breach, as had been perhaps naively expected, Western entrepreneurs 
preferred to wait for bankruptcy before starting from scratch on their own terms, 
and former national monopolies simply crumbled. By the first week of August, de 
Maiziere, supported by Kohl, had suggested that all-German elections be brought 
forward from the initially envisaged date of 2 December to 14 October, which was 
the date on which the five East German Lander were to be reconstituted and 
elections held in them. The FRG SDP leader, Oskar Lafontaine, argued for 15 
September, immediatedly after the ‘four plus two’ talks, although he clearly 
preferred the original December date, since the costs of unity would by then be 
evident and, he calculated, voters drifting away from Kohl. Kohl himself wanted 
both elections and unification on 14 October, arguing that it would be ‘disruptive 
and undemocratic to decouple the two’. However, an earlier polling date would 




























































































support in order to muster a sufficient majority. Since the SDP had always 
maintained that Kohl’s 1 July terms for economic and monetary union (GEMU) 
would rapidly prove deleterious, Kohl knew he was unlikely to get that support. 
Despite his earlier pronouncements and protestations, he had now seriously to 
contemplate decoupling elections and unification. Unification couldn’t wait, and he 
lacked the support to change the election date.
The final decision lay in the GDR Volkskammer, where political jockeying 
continued throughout August, as Kohl’s political stablemate, de Maziere, sought the 
best deal for the Christian Democrats. In protest against the Kohl/de Maziere 
preference for 14 October, the GDR SDP withdrew from the governing coalition. 
At last, in the early hours of 23 August, the Volkskammer settled for 3 October as 
the date for unification. With the formal conclusion of the ‘four plus two’ talks in 
Moscow on 12 September (the USSR holding out, as expected, for last-minute 
financial concessions), the way was clear for formal ratification of the Unification 
Treaty (Einigungsvertrag). The new Germany came into being on 3 October 1990. 
As has been seen, in the space of little more than a month, the date for unification 
was brought forward from early 1991 to 14 and then 3 October. Whilst welcome, 
these changes demanded nimble political footwork from the Community and its 
institutions.
3. Institutional Responses
L The European Council
As the highest Community political instance, the European Council was 
responsible both for giving the green light to unification and for creating the 
consensual framework within which the Community institutions could begin to 
formulate pragmatic and practical responses to the increasingly rapid pace of events 





























































































As noted above, at the 8 and 9 December 1989 Strasbourg European Council, 
the Heads of State and Government declared their approval in principle of the 
unification process, this in the context of a reinforced peace in Europe in which the 
German people might find their own ‘free determination’. The European Council 
encouraged the speedy conclusion of a trade agreement with the GDR which, at the 
time, seemed the most appropriate way of helping matters forward.
Events developed so fast after the fall of the Berlin wall that the Irish presidency 
felt obliged to call a special Council in Dublin (Dublin I) on 28 April 1990. The 
Council was largely devoted to German unification and political and economic 
liberalisation in other Central and Eastern European countries. The Heads of State 
and Government enthusiastically welcomed the prospect of German unification as 
a positive factor for the development of Europe and the Community. The Council 
undertook to ensure that the integration of the GDR territories into the Community 
would be done gently. No revision of the EEC Treaty would, they considered, be 
necessary; in other words, integration into the FRG would amount ipso facto to 
integration into the Community. At the time, this decision vexed the Parliament, 
which felt it had been cheated of its assent rights under EEC Article 237, which 
governs the mechanics of applications for membership of the Community. 
(Enlargement is one of the few areas in which the Parliament enjoys full assent 
powers.) However, the FRG Basic Law, which was drafted before the establishment 
of the GDR, always provided for the enlargement of the FRG to include other 
German territories, meaning those then occupied by the Russians. (The 3 October 
Einigungsvertrag contained a constitutional amendment which did away with Article 
23 of the Basic Law; Germany is now whole.) Lastly, the European Council called 
upon the Commission to make appropriate proposals for transitional measures and 
derogations to the Council and, following the Commission’s pragmatic prompting, 
decided that these should be presented together, in one ‘global report’. This 
decision also found its critics in the Parliament, who felt that one opinion on an 





























































































The second Dublin Council (25 and 26 June 1990) welcomed the conclusion of 
the Staatsvertrag, shortly to enter into force. It heard a report from Kohl on progress 
in the unification negotiations, and later met informally with the GDR Prime 
Minister, de Maziere. On the substance, the Heads of State and Government 
welcomed the fact that the Commission had been ‘able to accelerate its preparatory 
work’, so that the package of proposals could be expected for September 1990, and 
called upon the Council to make a rapid decision on the basis of these proposals, 
in line with the decisions taken at Dublin I.
Before the European Council could meet again, unification had taken place. 
But, like the apocryphal John Wayne character, it had done what it had to do.
u. The Commission
Until July 1990, the Comission pragmatically rode two legislative trains, one 
relatively fast, and one relatively slow. The slow train was the negotiation of a trade 
agreement with the GDR, as encouraged by the 1989 Strasbourg Council, and 
following in the wake of the Community’s pioneering agreement with Comecon. The 
fast train was unification which, folllowing Dublin I’s decisions, was not to be 
considered an enlargement but was nevertheless tantamount to one.
From the outset, the Commission recognised the need for close and centralised 
cooperation, both at political and at administrative level. At the political level, an 
ad hoc working group was established within the Commission college early in 1990, 
consisting in principle of all Commissioners but in practice of those whose fields of 
competence were in any way affected by the unification process. The college group 
was chaired by the German Vice-President of the Commission, Martin Bangemann 
(Bangemann’s affiliations with the FDP, and hence with the FRG’s governing 
coalition surely facilitated relations and dealings with the German government). At 
the administrative level, a specialised coordinating ‘task force’, composed of a small 
secretariat and specialists from the various services, was set up within the 
Commission Secretariat General in May 1990 (Commission decision 26 April), and 




























































































Confirming the political importance the Commission attached to this ‘dossier’, the 
task force was to report directly to the Secretary General, David Williamson, and 
was headed by the Deputy Secretary General, Carlo Trojan.
The Commission produced a first Communication to the Council on 19 April 
1990, in which it set out ‘scenarios’ for the unification procedure and integration 
into the Community, and identified the chief problems likely to arise. This 
Communication also attempted a first quantification of the enormous amount of 
negotiation and legislative adaptation that would be needed. On 13 June 1990, the 
Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation (duly adopted by the Council of 
28 June) which permitted the creation of a de facto customs union between the 
Community and the GDR in the period after the Staatsvertrag and before the 
Einigungsvertrag (that is, after economic, monetary and social union, but before total 
unification). The proposal was accompanied by two measures, one on controls, and 
one on special quota arrangements for steel and textiles.
When negotiations between the GDR and FRG authorities had reached a late 
stage, the Commission drafted a further Communication, on 14 June 1990, analysing 
the implications of the Staatsvertrag. In the wake of the 1 July 1990 implementation 
of the Staatsvertrag and the advancement of the date of unification to 3 October, the 
Commission advanced adoption of its overall legislative package (as called for by 
the Dublin I Council) at a special meeting on 21 August 1990. The package 
consisted of three ‘volumes’; Volume I was an explanatory memorandum, Volume 
II contained the legislative proposals, and Volume III contained an analysis of the 
financial implications of unification. (Because of this division, the legislative 
package was sometimes referred to simply as Volume II.) Following the 
Commission’s integration scenario, as elaborated in its 20 April Communication, the 
legislative package consisted of a series of legislative measures and technical 
adaptations, designed to facilitate a gentle integration of the former GDR 
territories into the FRG and the Community during a transitional phase. The sheer 
scale of the Commission’s achievement - akin to that involved in the formal 
accession of a new Member State - should not be underestimated. In effect, the 




























































































existing Community law in order to identify where there were objective grounds 
warranting technical adjustments and/or transitional measures (chiefly derogations). 
With a weather eye to the gathering pace of events, the Commission also proposed 
two emergency interim measures, designed to tide the FRG and EC authorities over 
were formal unification, and hence application of Community law, to take place 
before the transitional measures could be adopted.
Hi. The Parliament (2)
By a Resolution of 15 February 1990, the Parliament decided (Rule 109(2) of 
its Rules of Procedure) to institute a ‘Temporary Committee on the Implications 
of German Unification for the European Community’. The Resolution referred to 
the Commission’s decision to set up its own working group. Clearly, the initial 
intention was that the Temporary Committee should act as a parliamentary monitor 
and counter-balance. Composed of twenty members, the Committee held its first 
meeting on 1 March in Brussels. A Spanish Christian Democrat, Fernandez Albor, 
was elected Chairman, and a young British Labour MEP, Alan Donnelly, was 
appointed rapporteur. (Donnelly, part of the 1989 intake, had rapidly won his 
parliamentary spurs as rapporteur on an important report on Central Bank 
cooperation, part of the preparations for Stage One of EMU, as elaborated in the 
Delors Report.) At the outset, when unification seemed a fairly distant prospect, it 
was supposed that the Committee would make Parliament’s views known through 
an ‘initiative report’ (that is, not drafted as part of a formal consultation process), 
the traditional method in the absence of formal Commission proposals. However, 
because of the clear potential for rapid change in the situation, Parliament’s 
Enlarged Bureau authorised the Temporary Committee to draft both an interim and 
a final report. The views of Parliament’s standing committees were solicited 
throughout March, and the Interim Report was adopted on 12 July 1990.
Meanwhile, in response to events unfolding in the GDR, Parliament adopted 
several Resolutions. A first, adopted on 4 April 1990, responded enthusiastically to 




























































































the needs and consequences of unification. A second Resolution, adopted on 17 
May (de Maziere had given an informal address to MEPs the day before), 
supported the general conclusions of the special Dublin I European Council. These 
Resolutions provided the plenary and the political groups with a first means of 
expressing their views on the rapidly-changing political and economic situation.
Although the 12 July Donnelly Interim Report attempted a sectoral analysis of 
the consequences of unification, its chief demands and complaints were procedural 
in nature. As stated above, Parliament regretted that the European Council had not 
decided in favour of the new Treaty approach as, under the provisions of EEC 
Article 237, it would have required Parliament’s assent and ratification by ‘all 
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’. It 
also identified the need for an inter-institutional agreement on the calendar and 
working methods. Appended to the Interim Report was a Resolution which made 
the Temporary Committee the competent committee, in the sense of Parliament’s 
rules, for the consideration of the legislative proposals (’Volume II’) that the 
Commission had been charged to prepare by the European Council. This 
represented a major concession by Parliament’s standing committees, and was only 
granted after protracted debate. The standing committees were jealous of their 
legislative prerogatives, and were only reluctantly won over to the argument that the 
pace of events would otherwise risk outstripping Parliament’s capacity to respond. 
The Dublin I proposal for an overall legislative package was also only grudgingly 
accepted. Several MEPs had argued strongly in the Temporary Committee for 
separate parliamentary scrutiny of each Commission proposal. Again, practical 
arguments about limited timetabling won the day. Two further procedural 
considerations, ‘comitology’ and the conciliation procedure, are dealt with separately 
below.
Following the Commission’s 21 August adoption of Volume II, and the bringing 
forward of the date of unification to 3 October, Parliament was urgently consulted 
on the two Commission proposals for emergency interim measures. Donnelly’s 
rapporteurship was rapidly extended to the two proposals and, although Parliament 




























































































able to begin its consideration on the basis of informally-transmitted texts. These 
were first examined at a hybrid meeting of Heads of Political Groups and the 
Temporary Committee on 29 August. What then happened to the emergency 
interim measures is considered in detail below (7.i and 7.ii). The Commission’s 
major package of proposals on transitional measures and technical adaptations, 
‘Volume II’, was given its first reading in the 22-26 October parliamentary session, 
and its second reading in the 19-23 November session, and was adopted by the 
Council on 4 December 1990.
a. ‘Comitology’
Although ultimately overcome, a fundamental parliamentary objection surfaced 
in relation to the envisaged method embodied in the Commission’s proposals. It was 
championed in the Temporary Committee by Sir Christopher Prout, leader of the 
European Democratic Group (composed of British and Danish Conservatives), and 
an acknowledged constitutional expert within the Parliament. The problem focused 
on the proposed delegation of powers to the Commission to adapt legislation and 
authorise derogations. The Commission argued that the legislation had to include 
provision for the delegation of implementing powers, ‘so that any adjustments 
needed in the light of new information or developments in the former GDR can be 
made promptly’ (Volume I). It based its proposal on EEC Article 145 and Council 
Decision 87/373. These dry figures hide one of the most arcane and yet 
simultaneously one of the most hotly contested areas of inter-institutional dispute, 
known to insiders by the bastardised French jargon of ‘comitology’ (3).
Since it is very arcane, great detail will not be entered into here. In short, 
Council Decision 87/373 laid down three standard formats (seven variants 
altogether) for the Committees established to ‘assist’ the Commission in exercising 
delegated powers. These Committees are composed of national civil servants. The 
fundamental point is that Parliament has no say in these Committees at all; 
according to the three formats, the Commission has more or less power, but the 




























































































delegated powers and, where unavoidable, favours those Committee variants that 
give the Commission more power, on the basis that at least it has indirect control 
over the Commission. The basic institutional positions on ‘comitology’ are defended 
with almost religious fervour, and there was no difference on this occasion, with 
Parliament’s suspicions focusing on the apparently open-ended carte blanche the 
Commission was proposing for itself. In the end, a majority in the Committee 
accepted the Commission’s explanation that the sort of flexibility the sui generis 
situation necessitated could only be guaranteed through such a broad delegation of 
powers, but one of the Parliament’s earliest formulated demands (a particular 
concern of the French Liberal Group member and former President of the 
European Parliament, Simone Veil) was that these special powers should be strictly 
limited to an absolute minimum in time.
b. The Conciliation Procedure
Prout also led demands for another procedural innovation. After the adoption 
of the Single European Act in 1986, Parliament undertook a thorough overhaul of 
its Rules of Procedure, particularly in regard to the newly-constituted cooperation 
procedure. Prout had been Parliament’s rapporteur on that occasion, and one of the 
innovations he had sought to introduce was an extension of the conciliation 
procedure (previously restricted to certain measures in the budgetary field) to the 
new cooperation procedure (4).
The old conciliation procedure, established by a joint institutional declaration 
(4 March 1975), created a ‘Conciliation Committee’, consisting of the Council and 
representatives of the Parliament, assisted by the Commission, in which serious 
differences about Community acts having ‘appreciable financial implications’ could 
be whittled down until the positions of the two institutions were sufficiently close 
for Parliament to be able to give its opinion.
The Prout-inspired Rules 43 and 44(1) sought unilaterally to introduce a more 
light-weight conciliation mechanism for cooperation procedure first readings, where 




























































































sphere, Council and Parliament are twin arms of the budgetary authority. In fact, 
it is the nearest Parliament gets to being a true co-legislator. Clearly, Prout hoped 
that the Parliament might gain similar status through the functioning of the 
cooperation procedure, but Council had never accepted Rule 43. Prout now argued 
that the unique nature of the German unification legislative package put Parliament 
in a powerful position to exact Council recognition of Rule 43, and thus to create 
a precedent for the future application of the conciliation procedure. As is discussed 
in Section 9, although what occurred was not a literal application of Rule 43, 
Parliament did gain a sort of variation on the conciliation procedure 
(Parliament-Presidency) at both first and second reading stages.
(V. The Council
Although theoretically uninvolved until in reception of the Commission’s 
proposals, the Council was naturally deeply involved from the very beginning, both 
because the affected Member State and the Commission reported back constantly 
on developments in negotiations with the GDR authorities, but also because of the 
general enthusiasm and concern of all Member State governments for the 
unification process, as first iterated at the Strasbourg European Council and then 
emphatically underlined at the Dublin I Council, together with the more general 
geopolitical considerations involved, particularly for the three Member States that 
were also part of the ‘four plus two’ process.
With the exception of the 28 June adoption of the Commission’s proposed 
Regulation for the creation of a customs union with the GDR, the Council first 
became involved at a formal, procedural level in the first, post-21 August ‘trialogue’ 
between the three institutions on the legislative timetable, which was to culminate 
in the three Presidents’ joint statement on the outcome of the Trialogue (Section 
5) and, at the outcome of a specially-organised 4 September COREPER meeting, 
in consulting Parliament on the emergency interim measures. A further COREPER 
meeting on 6 September approved the provisional timetable agreed by the Italian 




























































































itself, Council established an ad hoc German unification working group to consider 
the proposed legislation in specialised detail (external aspects, internal market, 
environment, structural funds, and so on).
4. The Commission’s Integration Scenario and the Need for Provisional Measures
In its 20 April Communication on German unification, the Commission had 
foreseen three distinct stages for the integration of the GDR into a unified 
Germany, and hence into the Community:
- an interim adjustment stage, which would begin with the introduction of 
inter-German monetary union, accompanied by social and economic reforms 
(what was to become, in effect, the Staatsvertrag);
- a second, transitional stage, beginning with the formal unification of the two 
Germanies;
- a final stage, in which the acquis communautaire would fully apply to all German 
territory.
During the interim adjustment stage, the GDR was expected to gradually bring 
in the legislation necessary for step-by-step integration into the FRG and 
Community system. The start of the transitional stage would coincide with the 
formal unification of the two German states. Community legislation would then 
automatically apply in the former territory of the GDR except where specifically 
decided otherwise.
In its 4 June Communication on the implications of the Staatsvertrag, the 
Commission recognised that the interim adjustment stage would begin with the 
entry into force of the Staatsvertrag on 1 July. It was impossible to set a timetable 
for full unification, and thus to foresee exactly how long the adjustment stage would 
last. Donnelly’s Interim Report, adopted as late as 12 July, stated that ‘unification 
could well take place by early 1991’. As has been pointed out, by the time the 




























































































adjustment stage would be very much shorter than had been envisaged; so short, in 
fact, that unification would be achieved before the Community institutions had had 
time to conclude their examination of the necessary legislation. As the Dublin I 
Council had been aware, a serious problem would have arisen, particularly in the 
East, after 3 October if Community law had been in full application, without the 
necessary derogations in place, and with no practical possibility for the German 
authorities to meet all of their obligations. To avoid this situation, the Commission 
had put forward its two proposals (a Directive and a Regulation) for emergency 
interim measures. Even so, the timetable was always going to be extremely tight, 
since only one Parliamentary plenary session was scheduled between the 
Commission’s August meeting and the date ultimately chosen for unification and, 
since the legal base of the proposed Directive included EEC Article 100A, an 
unprecedented two readings would have to take place during that one September 
week.
5. The Presidential Trialogue
The Commission’s 14 June Staatsvertrag Communication had underlined the 
importance of close institutional cooperation, as had Parliament in its several 
Resolutions and Interim Report. This now became imperative. In addition to 
constant concertation on legislative timetabling at the administrative level, there was 
need for a political level agreement. At the initiative of Parliament’s President, 
Enrico Baron Crespo, a ‘trialogue’ was organised between the Presidents of the 
three institutions involved. The Presidential Trialogue took place on 6 September, 
with Jacques Delors attending for the Commission, and Gianni De Michelis for the 
Italian Presidency-in-Office.
The three Presidents adopted a series of conclusions and undertakings related 
both to the overall legislative package, and to the passage of the emergency interim 
measures. They agreed that all measures in the overall package should have entered 
into force ‘by the end of 1990 at the latest’, thus providing an outer envelope for the 




























































































Parliament undertook to hold a first reading on Tuesday, 11 September and, ‘if 
necessary’, a second reading on Thursday, 13 September. The Council meanwhile 
undertook to consider Parliament’s amendments on Wednesday, 12 September. The 
Presidential Trialogue had given the necessary political clearance, but there was 
clearly no room for error, and therein lay the rub. The political heads of the 
institutions had collectively raised their stakes. From then on, no institution would 
want to be seen to be reneging on the agreement lightly, for fear of being accused 
of wrecking the legal process of unification itself.
6. The Substance of the Commission’s Emergency Proposals
L The Underlying Process
As pointed out in Section 4, the Dublin I Council’s decision against application 
of EEC Article 237, and the FRG’s decision to use Article 23 of the Basic Law 
meant that unification would entail the incorporation of the GDR ipso jure into the 
Community legal order. In other words, the entire panoply of Community law would 
automatically apply. Such integration would not involve any amendment of the 
Treaties or any other act constituting primary law. By contrast, an immediate, 
comprehensive application of secondary legislation was not possible. As with any 
accession, various technical adjustments were needed on account of the specific 
features of the former GDR’s socio-economic and legal system. More numerously, 
particular difficulties in several sectors necessitated transitional arrangements to 
allow the former GDR’s legislation to be gradually adapted to the Community 
system. These adjustments and transitional arrangements formed the bulk of the 
Commission’s Volume II. However, since unification was to take place before the 
package was adopted, the Commission sought special temporary powers to authorise 
the German authorities to retain existing legislation applicable in the territory of 
the former GDR which did not conform to Community law, but which would 





























































































The temporary powers the Commission sought were contained in two provisional 
measures, a Regulation and a Directive. The draft Regulation (which, in its original 
proposed form, was subject to the classic consultation procedure) consisted of 
interim measures to be applied in such fields as relations with Eastern European 
countries, information exchange on consumer products, and the environment. The 
draft Directive (which was to be subject to the cooperation procedure) was to cover: 
transitional internal market measures based on EEC Article 100A; transitional 
measures concerning the recognition of professional qualifications; transitional 
measures, based on EEC Article 118A, related to workers’ health and safety; and 
some environmental matters related to the internal market.
iiL Method
The substance of the two texts was broadly similar. Article 2 of both the draft 
Directive and the draft Regulation granted to the Commission the power to 
‘authorise the Federal Republic of Germany to provisionally keep in force in the 
territory of the former GDR legislation which does not comply with a Community 
act’. The Commission powers were to be carefully circumscribed: legislation kept 
in force this way had to conform to a Volume II transitional measure, as listed in 
annexes; the authorisation was to remain in force only until the Council had taken 
a final decision on Volume II; the FRG and the Commission had to notify the 
Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee of any use made 
of the authorisation; and, lastly, Article 4 of the Directive (with a cross-reference 
to Article 5 in the Regulation) provided for a Regulatory (type ‘I1IA’) Committee 




























































































7. The Legislative Passage
L First Reading
As noted in Section 3.iii, although Parliament was not formally siezed by the 
Council until 6 September, the Temporary Committee was already able to begin an 
informal consideration of the emergency proposals at its 29 August meeting. This 
gave the Commission additional warning of the likely sticking points and problem 
areas, and together with the Italian Presidency it was able to pass this information 
on to the 4 September COREPER meeting. With the legislative timetable firmly 
established by the 6 September Trialogue, the Temporary Committee met again on 
10 September in the margins of the Strasbourg plenary. By then Parliament had 
officially received the proposals and decided to refer them to the Temporary 
Committee. (In a further example of helpful rule-bending, the deadline for 
amendments in committee had been set at 6 September; that is, four days before 
Parliament had been officially consulted.)
In the Temporary Committee’s 29 August and 10 September meetings, Donnelly 
had supported the idea of emergency measures and the delegation of extraordinary 
powers to the Comtnission as the only possible way forward, but he had also sought 
guarantees on four principle issues, announcing his intention to table amendments 
to cover these. First, he insisted that the emergency procedure should not prejudice 
Parliament’s position on the substance of the Volume II derogations and measures. 
Secondly, he sought a strict time limit on the Commission’s extraordinary powers, 
to 31 December 1990. Thirdly, he favoured a direct dialogue with the FRG and the 
GDR authorities, and demanded that the Commission and the German authorities 
should inform Parliament of any measures taken under the emergency powers. 
Lastly, on the ‘comitology’ issue, the rapporteur insisted that, while not wishing to 
re-open the traditional inter-institutional conflict, he had reservations on the 
proposed committee variant. (The Commission, caught between ‘the devil and the 





























































































In order to allay the Committee’s misgivings about the FRG authorities’ capacity 
to deal with the practicalities of maintaining an interim regime within an essentially 
unified structure, and to assure Parliament of the FRG’s intentions of maintaining 
a dialogue, the FRG Deputy Foreign Minister, Irmgard Adam Schwatzer, attended 
the 10 September Strasbourg meeting, on the eve of the first reading. Her visit 
provided vital reassurance for the Temporary Committee, and enabled the 
rapporteur to confidently pass on this reassurance to the plenary. Neither Council 
nor the Commission raised any fundamental difficulties with the no-prejudice clause 
and the limiting date, which left the familiar issue of ‘comitology’. The Commission 
was essentially indifferent on the matter, and its representative in the Temporary 
Committee, Deputy Secretary General Carlo Trojan, urged the two institutions not 
to prejudice agreement on the basis of such an arcane dispute.
The first reading plenary debate took place the next day, with Delors and 
Bangemann representing the Commission, the Italian Deputy Foreign Minister, 
Vitalone, representing the Council, and a delegation of Volkskammer 
representatives attending as observers. Although several speakers sounded notes of 
caution, the debate revealed a remarkable degree of consensus, later reflected at 
the vote, where the Temporary Committee’s amendments were voted through on 
large majorities. Parliament adopted amendments in four principal areas, largely 
reflecting the misgivings voiced by Donnelly in committee: a non-prejudice clause; 
introduction of the limiting date of 31 December 1990; information on the use of 
the emergency powers; and ‘comitology’, where Parliament proposed a different 
committee variant (‘management’, or TIa’) that gave the Commission slightly more 
power. In addition to these ‘key amendments’, which Donnelly referred to as 
‘pre-conditions’, Parliament sought concessions or reassurance in three other areas: 
a statement of intent from the Commission on how it would use the emergency 
powers; practical undertakings on monitoring; and reassurances on the financial 
implications of unification.
Delors took on board most of the Parliament’s demands and, at the end of the 
debate, Bangemann assured Parliament on the financial aspects. In turn, Vitalone 




























































































absolute respect’ for Parliament’s views, promosing to transmit them faithfully to 
the next morning’s specially convoked Council meeting. Parliament’s first reading 
report was adopted 257:35:6, with a few members of the far right and the far left 
abstaining or voting against.
ii Second Reading
Parliament’s amendments were officially transmitted to the Council later the 
same evening. As expected, ‘comitology’ proved the major sticking point, but here 
the Italian Presidency and the Commission had been able to forewarn the Council, 
and a compromise in line with Parliament’s amendments was taken up. One 
substantial decision was to change the legal base of the Regulation to contain EEC 
Article 100A. The two Council texts were then translated and transmitted back to 
the Parliament on the Wednesday evening.
Two potential procedural problems arose. Firstly, the only reading on what had 
formerly been a Regulation had been delivered on the Tuesday evening, but now 
that EEC Article 100A had been added to the legal base, it became subject to the 
cooperation procedure, thus creating an almost theological problem. Could the text 
adopted by the Council be considered as a Common Position? A polite fiction was 
maintained whereby the Parliament considered it had given its first reading. A 
second potential problem arose in relation to the Commission’s commentary on the 
Common Positions. According to the conventions established between the 
institutions, this should have been delivered in written form, duly translated into all 
the Community languages, but there was insufficient time for this. In the event, 
Parliament authorised the Commission to communicate its comments orally to the 
Temporary Committee.
The Committee met immediately after the Wednesday sitting. Vitalone 
introduced the Common Positions, and Trojan communicated the Commission 
commentary, as arranged. This was short and sweet. In the Commission’s opinion, 
Council had met all of the Parliament’s demands, and it therefore recommended 




























































































provided Parliament with copies of the statements made for insertion in the Council 
minutes that had accompanied the adoption of the Common Positions. This was a 
considerable departure. Unilateral, bilateral and multilateral statements in the 
minutes are a vital device for reaching agreement in the Council and, although they 
might occasionally leak out to parliamentarians, are usually considered to be highly 
confidential. However, on this occasion the ten statements formed an integral part 
of the institutional compromise and, as such, were referred to both in the 
Commission’s commentary and by the rapporteur.
The second reading debate took place on schedule the next day, with 
Bangemann representing the Commission and Vitalone the Council. Donnelly 
announced that his ‘preconditional’ amendments had all been taken on board, and 
that other parliamentary preoccupations had been met by clear statements in the 
Council minutes. Since the Council had introduced two minor changes to the text, 
Parliament exercised its prerogative in introducing two new minor amendments. 
Bangemann promptly took these on board, and Vitalone assured the Parliament of 
the Presidency’s support. At the end of it all, Bangemann spoke of ‘the exemplary 
spirit of conciliation’ which had guided the inter-institutional dialogue throughout, 
and underlined the importance of this for future discussions on the extension of 
Parliament’s powers. The rapid political process had, he affirmed, been an ‘acid test’ 
for the Community, refuting perceptions of bureaucratic rigidity and underlining 
Community solidarity.
EEC Article 149.2(d) provides that ‘The Commission shall, within a period of 
one month, re-examine the proposal on the basis of which the Council adopted its 
Common Position, by taking into account the amendments proposed by the 
European Parliament’. In fact, the Commission was able to transmit its re-examined 
proposal the next day, 14 September. At its meeting on Monday, 17 September, the 
General Affairs Council was able to adopt the Commission’s re-examined proposals 
as they stood. Thus, just twenty-seven days after the Commission had adopted its 
original draft proposals, and only ten days after the Council formally consulted the 
Parliament, the emergency legislation had been adopted, leaving the Community 





























































































Those who have seen the Community’s institutions and its legislative process at 
close quarters would be entitled to ask ‘how was it done?’ After all, in giving a 
second reading opinion within twenty-four hours of receiving the Council’s Common 
Positions, Parliament was doing what it could have done within three, or even four, 
months, had it so wished. On a purely administrative level, constant concertation 
between the three institutions on timetabling required an extraordinary degree of 
coordination, the more so since the uncertainties about the date of unification 
presented the legislative process with a moving target. How, then, was it done? 
Three factors - centralisation, political preparation, and, above all, institutional 
flexibility - were of particular importance.
At the political level, institutional positions were effectively channelled through 
just a few key actors; Delors and Bangemann, Baron Crespo and Donnelly, 
Vitalone, and Adam Schwatzer. This concentration of political power (in the sense 
of freedom to manouevre) and responsibility (each had to go back and convince the 
members of his or her respective organisation of the merits of any agreement 
reached or concession made) in the hands of just a few key players clearly 
facilitated compromise and and cooperation. Concentration at political level was 
matched at administrative level. Small, competent and dedicated units were set up 
within each of the three Community institutions (the task force in the Commission’s 
Secretariat General, the secretariat to the Temporary Committee in the European 
Parliament, and latterly the secretariat to the Council ad hoc working group), and 
key officials designated in the German, Irish and Italian permanent representations. 
Enjoying priority within their own institutions and privileged access to information 
and resources, sharing long hours, and constantly rubbing shoulders in negotiating 
rooms with each other and with the FRG authorities, these administrative 
concentrations permitted rich and constant flows of information, discouraged 





























































































A second important factor was the degree of political preparedness of the 
institutional actors involved. Here, the Commission and the Council Presidency 
played vital roles in explaining positions and informing Parliament’s rapporteur and 
Temporary Committee, COREPER and the Council, and in trying to head off 
potentially divisive issues by laying early foundations for compromise. On the 
‘comitology’ issue, for example, the Commission had already won provisional 
agreement from COREPER on what was to become the final compromise with 
Parliament (the halfway house of a Management Committee) even before the 
Temporary Committee had tabled its amendments. In the weeks leading up to the 
September plenary, there were several informal meetings between Parliament’s 
rapporteur, the Council Presidency, and the Commission, at which minor problems 
were boiled off, and more substantial differences distilled down to their essentials; 
in effect, an informal conciliation procedure. The Commission and the Italian 
Presidency acted as constant go-betweens. In addition, the three institutions 
demonstrated preparedness to re-organise their internal work around the agreed 
timetable in such a way as to facilitate the process of compromise. Thus, for 
example, the Parliament’s 29 August Temporary Committee meeting had been 
preceded by a meeting of the Enlarged Bureau, with Bangemann attending both.
A third vital factor was an extraordinary institutional flexibility, apparent at both 
the political and administrative levels, and a preparedness to bend the letter of 
hard-won or hard-defended institutional conventions. Examples have been scattered 
throughout this account: clearing Parliament’s over-charged and back-logged 
legislative agenda of much other important legislative work in order to make space 
for two readings; agreeing to two readings within a week; setting deadlines for 
amendments that preceded official reception of the proposals; the organisation of 
extraordinary meetings of the Council and COREPER; making statements in the 
Council minutes available to the Parliament; changing the Regulation’s legal base, 
and the polite fiction of a first reading; allowing the Commission to make its first 
reading commentary orally in committee; compromise on the vexed ‘comitology’ 
issue; the cooperation of the German Deputy Foreign Minister; and, despite real 




























































































acceptance of the Commission’s logic in requesting temporary exceptional powers. 
Clearly, the institutions were locked into a tight timetable by this logic, and by the 
undertakings given by the three Presidents at the Trialogue (although in theory only 
Delors could entirely commit his institution in this way). Clearly, this flexibility had 
much to do with a sense of historical occasion, and all sides had much to lose if 
things went wrong. Nevertheless, the institutions proved that they were equal to the 
occasion by temporarily leaving aside their differences and by adopting the 
‘exemplary spirit of conciliation’ and of ‘constructive participation’ that Bangemann 
and Vitalone had emphasised in their speeches to the Parliament.
9. Conclusion: Lessons for the Institutions
The procedural and political repercussions of the concessions given in 
September 1990 may take a long time to work their way through the Community 
system since, despite disclaimers on all sides, it will be difficult to defend principles 
temporarily conceded with the same degree of plausibility and intensity as was 
possible before. Ultimately, however, the process itself will be largely forgotten, and 
the urgent measures adopted on 17 September will be seen in retrospect as a minor 
element in the unification and integration process. As stated at the outset, their 
adoption represented a quiet victory for the Community institutions, both jointly 
and severally. At the collective level, it demonstrated graphically how they were 
able to rise to the particular demands of a unique historical situation. But the sui 
generis nature of the situation does not mean that lessons of possible future 
relevance cannot be drawn from the experience at the individual institutional level.
For the Council, or at least for the Council Presidency, there was a new 
experience of entering into real ministerial dialogue outside the classic budgetary 
process. As was seen in 3.iii.b, application of the conciliation procedure, previously 
considered to be restricted to the budgetary field, had been one of Parliament’s 
earliest demands once the vast extent and short timetable of the unification process 
became evident. Though it was never officially referred to as such, the repeated 




























































































several occasions in informal talks with the rapporteur, amounted to a conciliation 
procedure. The historical backdrop against which this procedure was taking place 
clearly discouraged relatively minor institutional differences and preoccupations 
from taking on major significance as leverage in negotiations, as can sometimes 
otherwise be the case. But two lessons remain clear for the Council. Firstly, 
ministerial dialogue did not lead to any inflationary tendencies in Parliament’s 
position, which was initially realistically couched and remained consistent and 
reasonable throughout. Secondly, ministerial dialogue was a positive experience in 
itself, facilitating agreement on most outstanding issues. (The situation is 
reminiscent of a schoolboy comic book scene, where the surly and aloof boy, who 
had previously kept his classmate at arm’s length, is obliged by circumstances to join 
forces to achieve a commonly-desired aim. The caption underneath would read 
something like ‘By Jove! Old Parliament’s not such a bad chap after all!’)
There is a possible lesson for the Commission to draw in the more general 
context of institutional reform and, in particular, the two Inter-Governmental 
Conferences. Parliament has been consistent in its demands for a move towards 
shared co-decision-making power with the Council. As most recently outlined in the 
third Martin Interim Report (Parliament’s proposals to the Inter-Governmental 
Conferences), this would amount to some version of an extension of the powers that 
Parliament currently enjoys in the budgetary field, including recourse to a 
conciliation procedure. It may be thought that co-decision for the Parliament would 
necessarily amount to a diminution in the Commission’s power and influence. 
Experience with the passage of the emergency measures showed that these 
apprehensions might be misplaced. Article 1 of the 1975 Declaration on the 
conciliation procedure foresees the ‘active participation’ of the Commission, and 
this language is taken up in Parliament’s Rule 43. In the events recounted above it 
is clear that the Commission played a vital and indispensable role as go-between, 
negotiator and honest broker, in addition to its traditional role as drafter of the 
proposals, and as intended recipient of the requested special powers. In the 





























































































Parliament can draw several lessons from its experience. The early life of the 
Temporary Committee was marred by fractious and at times ugly disputes over its 
role and powers relative to the standing committees. These differences were finally 
overcome, though grumbles resurfaced regularly (5). Parliament’s experience 
showed that the decision to grant the Temporary Committee ad hoc chef de file 
powers was not only appropriate, but vital. The lesson is clear. Parliament can only 
succeed where centralised political and technical coordination can overcome 
internal rivalries, and where mechanisms for formulating and expressing consensus 
are allowed to function freely.
At the inter-institutional level, Parliament may draw another lesson; that it can 
only hope to influence the other institutions if it possesses sufficient leverage in 
matters that are as salient to the other institutions’ interests as they are to the 
Parliament itself. The time factor clearly gave Parliament additional leverage (as 
well as imposing additional restraint), but its chief arm was the other institutions’ 
fear of failure and public embarrassment on a matter that both considered to be of 
extreme importance.
All three institutions have together learnt two important lessons that, as 
Bangemann intimated, may be of great relevance in the context of the ouverture 
towards other East European countries, but are also of more general and everyday 
application; flexibility is not necessarily synonymous with weakness, and direct 





























































































(1) For two early considerations of the legal issues involved, see Tomuschat, C., ‘A 
United Germany within the European Community’, and Timmermans, C., ‘German 
Unification and Community Law’, in The Common Market Law Review N ° 27,1990, 
pp. 415-436 and 437-449, respectively.
(2) Parliament’s and the Temporary Committee’s activities have been summarised 
in an internal Parliamentary document. See Fernandez Albor, G., and Donnelly, A., 
‘Draft Report on Activities for the Enlarged Bureau’, PE 145.035, 28.11.90.
(3) The term ‘comitology’ was probably first coined in English by C. Northcote 
Parkinson (‘it is surprising more attention has not been paid to the science of 
comitology’), in Parkinson’s Law, John Murray, London, 1959, p. 39. For a general 
explanation of ‘comitology’, see Nicoll, W., ‘Qu’est-ce la < <comitologie> > ?’ in 
Revue du Marché Commune, N ° 306, 1987, pp. 185-187 and, for an exposition of 
Parliament’s view, Reich, C., ‘Le parlement européen et la < <  comitologie> > ’, in 
Revue du Marché Commune, N ° 336, 1990, pp. 319-323.
(4) On the conciliation proceduree, see Forman, J., ‘The Conciliation Procedure’, 
in Common Market Law Review, N ° 293, 1986, pp. 3-10.
(5) For example, the Commission’s proposals for the creation of a de facto Customs 
Union between the Community and the GDR were sent to Parliament’s Committee 
on Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development so that ‘Since it was not the 
committee responsible and the proposals had not been referred to it for an opinion 
either, (the Temporary Committee) was unable to set out its position in formal 
terms’. (PE 145.035, p. 6).
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